TeamPCP Linked to Redis Attacks Dating Back to 2020 and Later Supply Chain Campaign

A new analysis by Oligo Security has uncovered that the threat actor known as TeamPCP has been active in the cybercrime scene since at least 2020, long before its recent high-profile supply chain attacks. The group has been compromising internet-facing infrastructure for years, evolving from targeting Redis servers to orchestrating sophisticated software supply chain compromises.

Researchers Avi Lumelsky and Gal Elbaz identified overlapping domains, malware deployment paths, staging techniques, backend infrastructure, and operational tradecraft linking TeamPCP to earlier campaigns. These include ShadowRay 2.0 (aka IronErn), which hijacked AI infrastructure into a self-propagating botnet, and TA-NATALSTATUS, which targeted exposed Redis servers to deliver cryptocurrency miners. The latter is considered an evolution of a campaign detailed by Trend Micro in April 2020.

TeamPCP first came to light in late 2025 when it was linked to the exploitation of flaws in React Server Components (RSC) and Next.js, an operation codenamed Operation PCPcat. Later, Flare documented a massive campaign targeting cloud-native environments to build distributed proxy and scanning infrastructure for follow-on exploitation, including data exfiltration, ransomware, extortion, and cryptocurrency mining.

The group has since branched into supply chain compromises by poisoning popular open-source libraries through GitHub Actions and token theft abuse. Oligo’s findings establish a direct operational bridge between ShadowRay 2.0 and TeamPCP’s later infrastructure, showing that the actor repeatedly abused known vulnerabilities in React, Docker, Redis, and Ray, using automated and wormable techniques for self-propagation.

Recent malware updates include a Python script (kube.py) used after breaching Kubernetes environments. New variants, observed as recently as March 2026, incorporate wiper-like functionality. The destructive code checks if the victim system is configured for the Iran timezone; if so, it deploys a DaemonSet that wipes every node in the cluster via a wiper named Kamikaze. On Kubernetes nodes outside Iran, it deploys the CanisterWorm backdoor. For non-Kubernetes Iranian systems, it executes a poison_pill() routine to erase the entire file system.

While the exact relationship between the historical actors and TeamPCP cannot be determined with 100% certainty, Oligo concludes that TeamPCP represents the continuation of an existing operational ecosystem rather than a new threat actor.