In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: fix use-after-free at btmtksdio_recv_event We should not access skb buffer data anymore after hci_recv_frame was called. [ 39.634809] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btmtksdio_recv_event+0x1b0 [ 39.634855] Read of size 1 at addr ffffff80cf28a60d by task kworker [ 39.634962] Call trace: [ 39.634974] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3b8 [ 39.634999] show_stack+0x20/0x2c [ 39.635016] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x78 [ 39.635040] print_address_description+0x70/0x2f0 [ 39.635062] kasan_report+0x154/0x194 [ 39.635079] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x44/0x50 [ 39.635099] btmtksdio_recv_event+0x1b0/0x1c4 [ 39.635129] btmtksdio_txrx_work+0x6cc/0xac4 [ 39.635157] process_one_work+0x560/0xc5c [ 39.635177] worker_thread+0x7ec/0xcc0 [ 39.635195] kthread+0x2d0/0x3d0 [ 39.635215] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 39.635247] Allocated by task 0: [ 39.635260] (stack is not available) [ 39.635281] Freed by task 2392: [ 39.635295] kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68 [ 39.635319] kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c [ 39.635338] kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c [ 39.635357] ____kasan_slab_free+0x104/0x150 [ 39.635374] __kasan_slab_free+0x18/0x28 [ 39.635391] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x114/0x248 [ 39.635410] kfree+0xf8/0x2b4 [ 39.635427] skb_free_head+0x58/0x98 [ 39.635447] skb_release_data+0x2f4/0x410 [ 39.635464] skb_release_all+0x50/0x60 [ 39.635481] kfree_skb+0xc8/0x25c [ 39.635498] hci_event_packet+0x894/0xca4 [bluetooth] [ 39.635721] hci_rx_work+0x1c8/0x68c [bluetooth] [ 39.635925] process_one_work+0x560/0xc5c [ 39.635951] worker_thread+0x7ec/0xcc0 [ 39.635970] kthread+0x2d0/0x3d0 [ 39.635990] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 39.636021] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff80cf28a600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 39.636039] The buggy address is located 13 bytes inside of 512-byte region [ffffff80cf28a600, ffffff80cf28a800)
This Cyber News was published on www.tenable.com. Publication date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 02:56:03 +0000